Sometimes it’s amusing to see people’s faces when I tell them what I do, because people naturally assume that you must have some expertise in your subject. If you say you teach medicine, you must be a doctor; if you teach law, you must be a lawyer; if you teach music, you must be a musician; and so on. So it’s quite fun to tell people that ‘I teach terrorism’.

I do sometimes think it would be quite cool to actually teach terrorism – not that I know anything about making bombs, kidnapping, assassination or such-like. I do, however, feel that I could quite successfully blow up my own car or set fire to my trousers – which is all you really need to be capable of to become a world-famous terrorist these days. Over the years of researching and teaching about terrorism, I have learned quite a lot about what not to do if you want to be a successful terrorist. So if I was teaching a class in terrorism, these would be my Top Tips for Success – all based on true stories:

Number 1 – If you’re going to send a parcel bomb to someone, you must make sure to put enough postage stamps on the package. An Iraqi terrorist built a parcel bomb and duly posted it off. But he hadn’t put enough stamps on and it got returned to him. Failing to recognise the hand-writing, he thought he was getting a present and opened the parcel.

Number 2 – If you’re going to try and attack a military base, don’t buy a gun off someone who says he’ll sell it to you in exchange for a broken TV. There was a man in the US expressing radical views about how someone should attack the local military base in revenge for the Iraq invasion. He was befriended by a guy who agreed with him and who said, well, why don’t you do it? He replied that he didn’t have a gun. The man said he could sell him one. He replied that he didn’t have any money. The man said, well, what do you have? He said, I’ve got a TV – but it doesn’t work! The man said, OK, I’ll sell you a gun for a broken TV. Not thinking that this was in any way suspicious, he went ahead and exchanged the busted TV for the gun. Needless to say, he was immediately arrested by the undercover FBI agent and later sent to prison for life.

Number 3 – Never put the explosives you plan to detonate in your underpants. Not only is there too much room for things to go wrong, but the potential embarrassment factor is just too great. Imagine being in a high security prison for hardened murders and terrorists, and you’re the only one who has to sit down to pee. ‘See that guy? He was once a feared terrorist. I hear that these days he’s lost his balls.’ I sometimes wonder if he got the idea when he was ironing his trousers. He saw the label which said ‘flammable. Keep away from open flame’, but he thought: ‘I know, The Underpants of Fire!’

Number 4: if you’re taking the elective in suicide bombing and the instructor says, ‘now watch this very closely because I’m only going to do it once’ – you should probably run.

I could tell so many stories about how stupid terrorists are – like the guy who planned to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge in New York with a blow-torch. He didn’t realise that with a blow-torch it would take 80 years to cut through enough cables to make the bridge unstable. I actually think they should have let him start and watched to see how long it would take for him to give up. Or the guys who drove a car full of petrol into Glasgow airport, and then when they were on sufficiently on fire, got punched out by a Scottish man.

In case anyone is offended by jokes involving terrorism, I do have a serious point. A lot of people are afraid of terrorism and it makes them anxious and depressed. I think if we take a moment to reflect on many of the complete and utter idiots without a practical thought in their head who are trying to bring down Western civilisation, we might all feel a little better. I mean, if the greatest risk they pose is that they’re going to blow their own bollocks off – or light themselves on fire and get punched out – then we probably don’t need to be quite so anxious!

In addition, not only do I strongly believe that humour can be an important way of expressing and letting out our fears and anxieties, but the fact is that terrorism is really messing up our way of life. Or, more accurately, the response to terrorism is changing the way we live – for the worse. We are reminded practically every day by politicians, the media and ‘experts’ that terrorists are everywhere and they are out to get us. We see warning posters everywhere. You can’t open a bank account without producing written affidavits stating that you’ve never been in a terrorist training camp! And all that security at the airports!

Actually, I can proudly say that I predicted what has happened at airports so far. First we had 9/11 and airport security was looking for knives and weapons. Then we had the shoe bomber and we had to put our shoes through the scanner. Then we had the liquid explosives plot and you couldn’t take liquid onto the plane. At this point, I said to my wife: ‘All it will take is someone putting explosives in or under their clothes and they will have to strip-search everyone before they board’. And what happened? The Christmas Day Bomber puts explosives in his underpants, burns his own genitals and ruins it for everyone. The result: full-body scanners to be brought in at all airports.

Using my prophetic abilities, my next big worry is that some complete dickhead terrorist will put a massive fire-cracker or stick of explosive up his anus and try to board a plane. You might think I’m exaggerating, but it is the next logical step. Next thing you know, we’ll all have to have an anal cavity search before we can board a plane. In future, you may well have to take a tube of lubricant whenever you go to the airport – although it’ll have to be less than 100 mils and in a clear plastic bag! I expect the share price for rubber glove manufacturers will go through the roof! There’ll be added meaning when you get in your seat and start chatting to the person you’ll spending hours next to. They might be wiggling around trying to get comfortable. You’ll say: ‘Are you alright? Is your seat lumpy or something?’ He glances at you with a knowing look: ‘It’s not that. Can you believe it, I forgot to bring my lubricant. The security guy had large hands. Know what I mean?’

My point is that terrorism and the response to it has gone completely over the top, especially when you consider that the risk of terrorism is statistically minute. There’s a greater chance of you dying from choking to death on your meal tonight or some kind of alcohol-related cause – like falling asleep with your head in the toilet after a drunken night – than you ever falling victim to a terrorist attack (see my other blog on this).

For this reason – because society’s fight against terrorism has become a little too serious and threatens to ruin our lives – I have come up with a cunning plan to lighten things up a little and perhaps break down some of the absurdities of counterterrorism. It’s a pretty simple plan. It requires very little effort – just a little nerve – but I think it could change the world forever. With my interest in the role of language and how it constructs reality, and applying the knowledge I’ve gained, I’ve come to the realisation that if we replace a couple of letters in the word ‘terrorism’ to give it a new sound, it could have quite a profound effect.

What I am proposing is that we replace the ‘or’ in terror and terrorism with the letter ‘y’: ‘terrorism’ thus becomes ‘terryism’; ‘terror’ becomes ‘Terry’. The beauty of this plan is that it’s easy to say and people won’t even guess what you’re doing at first. They’ll just think they’ve misheard you, or you’ve got a speech impediment. It’s even funnier if you add a lisp: ‘tewyism’.

‘Hello. I teach tewyism.’

‘I think tewyism is such a big thweat.’

‘We must keep fighting the war on Tewy.’

To illustrate how this works in practice, you can take one of former president George Bush’s speeches and inserted the word ‘Terry’ in all the appropriate places.

‘My fellow Americans. We are at war with Terry. Terry stalks our streets and lurks in our communities. Terryism threatens our way of life. Terryists are resourceful, but so are we. Terryists are clever, but so are we. Terryists hate freedom and so do we. In short, ladies and gentlemen, I will not allow our great nation to be destroyed by Terry. The struggle against the evil of terryism will be long and costly. But I say to you: We will defeat Terry! We will win this war on terroryism.’

Of course, I’m very sorry to people called Terry. I originally thought you could kill two birds with one stone, because most of the famous Terrys are in fact, twats. John Terry – a useful footballer, but definitely a big twat. Terry Wogan – nice enough but a little bit of a twat sometimes. Terry Waite – went to the Middle East to secure the release of a hostage and got kidnapped himself. Definitely a little bit twattish. Terry Jones… well, he’s from Monty Python, so he’s clearly not a twat. But I think he’d really like the idea of a ‘war on terryism’ and wouldn’t object.

Seriously though, think of the positive consequences if it caught on:

Could al Qaeda ever frighten us again if we saw one of their spokesmen saying ‘we will unleash a wave of terrorism in your cities’ but inside our heads we heard: ‘we will unleash a wave of terryism across your cities’?

Could we ever take politicians seriously when they said: ‘terryism threatens our way of life. We need new methods to defeat Terry’?

Could we allow our leaders to pass a law called the ‘Prevention of Terryism Act 2010’?

In the end, I’m trying to make a serious point. We don’t have to just sit back and let the terryists or counter-terryists mess with us. We can fight back, even if it’s just by poking a little fun and subverting those who try to keep us frightened. My plea is that everybody who reads this blog makes an effort, at least once or twice, to keep a straight face and use the word ‘terryism’ in conversation. It’s empowering, and I’ve seen it start a serious debate about important issues. More importantly, you might even get a laugh.

While this is a humorous scenario, it is only slightly alarming that this is actually an accurate description of how counter-terrorism has come to work in the era of the war on terror. For the past ten years at least, we have been told that terrorism is a massive, evil force which is inevitable in this day and age – it is only a matter of when, not if a terrorist attack will take place. Terrorists are everywhere and can strike at any time and with any weapon. The only way to control terrorism is to spend billions of dollars improving security in public places, increase surveillance on all people at all times, get rid of legal protections for suspects, make everyone prove their identity, bring in harsh new laws, dispatch drones to kill hundreds of nameless people in foreign lands, torture suspects for information, kidnap and render people to secret prisons around the world, encourage people to spy on their neighbours, watch what we talk or read about lest we glorify terrorism, and much more besides. Moreover, we are told that these security rituals will have to be observed pretty much forever, because the threat of terrorism will never end, and we must include counter-terrorism in ever more areas of modern life because terrorism is spreading.

As before, the questions we should ask are: what evidence or information do you have, Mr Counter-terrorist, to suggest that this will in any way work – that it will actually make us safe from the evil scourge of terrorism? What is your counter-terrorist theory based on? What logic and evidence are you basing this on?

The alarming fact is that most counter-terrorism today is not based on theories and actual evidence, nor is it rooted in a historical or theoretical understanding of terrorism as a form of political violence. Significantly, not a single government since 9/11 has conducted a major study to examine whether the measures they have undertaken and the billions they have spent have either worked effectively to prevent terrorism, provides value for money, or could have been achieved some other less costly way. In reality, they are spending all that money and undertaking all those measures purely on faith. At the same time, scholars have also been very lax in studying whether counter-terrorism measures actually work, or how well they work; there are very few empirically-based studies on the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism measures. Interestingly, the few studies that have been done have concluded that either they don’t work (this is the case for security measures such as extra screening at airports, for example; these measures have a displacement effect, which means that terrorists tend to choose other less well-guarded targets), or importantly, they are actually counter-productive (this is the case for measures like targeted killings, for example, which tend to increase the number of recruits for terrorist groups).

In fact, most counter-terrorism during the last ten years of war on terror, as Joseba Zulaika has so eloquently shown, has been a self-fulfilling prophesy: actions undertaken which produce the very thing it is designed to destroy. We went to war against Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, tortured, assassinated and rendered thousands of suspected terrorists, all to prevent terrorism, while simultaneously knowing that it would most likely produce more terrorism (as foreign military intervention usually does) – which would then in turn, necessitate more counter-terrorism. On a smaller scale, FBI agents go out and encourage disaffected individuals to undertake terrorist operations, and then arrest them before they can undertake their plot – with massive publicity about ‘foiled plots’.

Importantly (and a little insanely), the sequence of events which occurs is then used as proof of the original assertion: ‘See, there are terrorists in Iraq/Pakistan/Yemen/Somalia, which is why we had to go there to fight them’; ‘See, there are terrorists within America who want to kill US citizens.’ In other words, we are told that we have to follow the prescriptions of the counter-terrorist, knowing that it will produce the very terrorism it is designed to counter, which will then justify further counter-terrorism measures.

The interesting thing is that this kind of tautological, mystical thinking and this kind of self-confirming behavior is what, so anthropologists tell us, characterizes the thinking and practices of divination and witchcraft. In a sense, counter-terrorists have become oracles or shamans in our society: they rely on secret knowledge, they tell us how to ritually fight the evil of terrorism, and they can never be tested or proven wrong. Their predictions and assertions do not require scientific validation or confirmation; instead, they tell us what to do to prevent terrorism and if no terrorism occurs, they claim they were therefore right to prescribe such measures. If terrorism does occur, they can also claim they were right about the danger of terrorism, and that more clearly needs to be done to counter it. In other words, there is no real (logical or empirical) way to prove a diviner or an oracle wrong. In the end, all we can do is to keep putting out the milk by the fencepost and chant, ‘numpty, numpty, noo noo’ while the sun sets on our civil liberties and freedoms…

If you want to read a much more detailed and eloquent analysis of counter-terrorism as witchcraft or divination, read Joseba Zulaika’s fascinating article in the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, issue 1, 2012.

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Sydney Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 22,000 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 8 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

The aim of my talk was to try and explain some crucial puzzles I have become aware of recently. Primarily, I was trying to explain why Terrorism Studies and Peace Studies have remained largely divorced, despite the fact that they both study the same thing? That is, they both study violent political conflict, but most of the research and scholars who focus on understanding and resolving violent political conflict within Peace Studies remain largely unacknowledged within the Terrorism Studies field. What might explain this state of affairs?

And why it is that most terrorism scholars, politicians and the media don’t seem to ‘know’ that terrorism is most often caused by military intervention overseas, and not religion, radicalization, insanity, ideology, poverty or such like? And how do they not know it when even the Pentagon has known it for years? For example, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board stated in the late 1990s that there is “a historical correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States”. Following this, an article entitled “DOES U.S. INTERVENTION OVERSEAS BREED TERRORISM?“ by Ivan Eland set out to examine the historical record. After extensive research, Eland concluded: “The large number of terrorist attacks that occurred in retaliation for an interventionist American foreign policy implicitly demonstrates that terrorism against U.S. targets could be significantly reduced if the United States adopted a policy of military restraint overseas.” This finding supports a veritable mountain of other research, including a recent ESRC-funded project on the motivations of jihadists. The question is: why isn’t this knowledge – and much more besides – more widely known, especially among Terrorism Studies scholars?

In my talk, I discuss many more examples of such ‘unknown’ knowledge in Terrorism Studies, before going on to explore the specific mechanisms and processes by which certain forms of knowledge are sometimes suppressed, hidden or ‘subjugated’ within the field. Next, I explore some of the consequences of such suppressions and exclusions. Apart from maintaining a kind of dominant commonsense about terrorism, I argue that the presence of subjugated knowledge means that the Terrorism Studies field exists in a highly unstable condition where certain forms of knowledge are simultaneously ‘known’ and ‘unknown’. In this unstable state, eruptions of subjugated knowledge sometimes emerge to destabilize the dominant terrorism discourse. I conclude by suggesting that Critical Terrorism Studies has a real opportunity to de-subjugate knowledge through various forms of discursive struggle.

First, we point out that it is actually very difficult to draw clear distinctions between what is ‘religious’ and what is ‘secular’ or ‘political’, both conceptually and empirically. Scholars of religion still cannot agree on the fundamental characteristics of religion and whether they are unique among social groups. For example, if religion is characterized by the use of ritual and a belief in transcendent values, then there are a great many ‘secular’ groups and ideologies which have these characteristics. Certainly, it is extremely difficult to distinguish ethnicity and nationalism (both of which are imbued with transcendent symbolism and ritual) from religion. If we cannot even define religion or separate it clearly from the secular or political, then the term ‘religious terrorism’ becomes pretty meaningless.

Second, and related to this, we argue that in practice it is difficult to see what would really distinguish a ‘religious’ terrorist group from a ‘secular’ terrorist group. Is it their goals, their stated beliefs, their targets, or some other characteristic? If so, in reality, many of the groups which are argued to be ‘secular’ have religious elements (such as ETA’s historical roots in Catholicism and its religious symbolism), while many ‘religious’ groups display secular characteristics (such as al Qaeda’s strategic goals of driving the West out of the Arabian Peninsular, and its attacks on diplomatic and military targets). Even if we look at terrorist targets, can we so easily determine the role of religion? If a group attacks a synagogue or a mosque, is it because they are symbolic of a religiously-defined enemy, or simply because this is where people regularly gather and it is an inviting target? The point is simply that it is not clear how we might determine that it is a ‘religious’ impulse rather than a strategic or secular impulse which determines a group’s behavior, organization or goals.

Third, we review the empirical evidence and show that there are no consistent reasons for thinking that ‘religious terrorists’ are any different in their behavior, goals, organization, and the nature of their followers from their ‘secular’ counterparts. For example, if anyone thinks Hamas or al Qaeda are more fanatical than ‘secular’ groups, a quick study on Peru’s Shining Path, or the German RAF will quickly dispel that notion. Moreover, there are often understandable political or strategic reasons for supposedly ‘religious’ behavior. The reason why there is a concentration in terrorism in the Middle East, for example, is probably due to its strategic location, its oil, great power interference, the role of Israel and a long history of war, intervention, and political instability, rather than because it is populated by a great many Islamic countries. Similarly, the reason why Hamas organizes through Mosques is probably because the Mosque is the centre of social and political life in an Islamic society and is therefore the optimal way to build a movement. In the end, we show that it is incorrect and misleading to assume that religion causes terrorism in any meaningful or identifiable sense. Terrorism is a strategy of political violence employed by actors seeking to achieve a political goal like self-determination, the expulsion of an invader, the overthrow of a particular regime, the over-turning of laws, or a broader revolution leading to a new political order. Examine any terrorist group closely and you will find the strategic logic behind its actions and a set of short, medium and long-term political objectives.

We conclude the article by showing how our understanding of ‘religion’ and ‘religious terrorism’ is a product of history and the nature of social science. More importantly, we show how it has a series of negative consequences, not least of which is that we tend to misunderstand and misdiagnose the sources of contemporary violence and consequently then apply the wrong solutions to it. Assuming that religion causes terrorism, for example, automatically stigmatizes religious people and places them under suspicion, while simultaneously blinding us to the violence of our own ‘secular’ politics which generates resistance. A great many contemporary counter-terrorism measures, based on the misplaced belief that terrorism is caused by excessive religiosity, have proved to be both ineffective and intensely damaging to human rights and community trust.

In the end, we do not suggest that religion is totally unimportant or completely unrelated to terrorism, but simply that our current understandings are inadequate and we need to try to find alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence today.

All the arguments presented here are discussed in much more detail in our free to download article, ‘What’s so “religious” about “religious terrorism”?’

Ibrahim al-Yussuf (age 12); Jalal al-Yussuf (age 17); Hashim Kamel Radi (age 22); Fateha Ghazzi (age 8); Nada Abdallah (age 16); Khowla Abdel-Fattah (age 70); Faris El Baur (age 11); Saif El Baur (age 11); Marwa Abbas (age 11);  Tabarek Abbas (age 8); Safia Abbas (age 5); Qassem Moussa (age 42); Thamer Abdel-Wahid (age 27); Nujah Abdel-Ridda (age 27); Arkan Daif (age 14); Walid Abu Shaker (age 23); Samar Hussein (age 13); Mohammad Ahmed (age 4); Nadia Kalaf (age 33); Zeena Akram Hamoodi (age 12); Mustafa Akram Hamoodi (age 13); Zain El Abideen Akram Hammodi (age 18); Zainab Akram Hamoody Hamoodi (age 19); Hassan Iyad Hamoodi (age 10); Ammar Muhammad Hamoodi (age 1); Wissam Abed Hamoodi (age 40); Dr. Ihab Abed (age 34); Duaa Raheem (age 6); Sa’la al-Mousai (age 55); Alaa-eddin Khazal (age 42); Wadhar Handi (age 34); Bashir Handi (age 28); Safa Karim (age 11)

Sena Hassad (age 36); Rana Hassad (age 10); Maria Hassad (age 7); Sama Sami (age 30) and daughters Lana, Miriam and Lava; Salma Amin (age 50) and sons Mohammed (age 27), Said (age 24), and daughter Shams (age 20); Hanna Fatah (age 70); Noor Sabah (age 12); Abdul Khader (age 5); Hamsa Mohammed Omar (age 6); Hamsa Mohammed Omar (age 12); Ali Ramzi (age 10); Abu Salam Abdul Gafir (age 16); Rowand Mohammed Suleiman (age 8 months); Haithem Tamini (age 7); Nora Tamini (age 9); Arkan David Belu (age 28); Muhammed al-Barheini (age 25); Dana Ali (age 8); Lamiya Ali (age 6); Abdullah Abdul-Majeed al-Sa’doon (age 26); Salman Abu al-Heel (age 25); Waleed Saleh Abdel-Latif (age 32); Tuamer Abdel Hamid (age 47); Hussein Rashid (age 18); Ali Salim (age 14); Ahmed al Rifaai (age 13)

Afghanistan:

Muhammad Makai (age 22); Bilal Gulam Rasul (age 4); Kaled Gulam Rasul (age 6); Wares Gulam Rasul (age 12); Samin Gulam Rasul (age 9); Sukuria Rasul (age 30); Said Mir-Said Jan (age 55); Said Mir-Said Mir (age 26); Nazira-Said Mir (age 21); Sofi Kasim (age 39); Aziza-Khuja Fagir (age 23); Sima Ahmad (age 35), his wife Gul Ahmad (age 40), and their children Sidiqqa Gul Ahmad (age 18), Shokria Gul Ahmad (age 16), Razia Gul Ahmad (age 10), Zakera Gul Ahmad (age 8), Fahima Gul Ahmad (age 5), Ramazan Gul Ahmad (age 12); Mira Jan (age 14); Lal Muhammad (age 35); Shar Maliki (age 75)

A further commemorative list of the names of around 5,000 Iraqi civilians can be found here, and the names of 3,767 Afghan civilians here. These names constitute a small fraction of the more than 600,000 civilians killed in our wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

WE MUST NEVER FORGET THESE FELLOW HUMANS KILLED IN OUR NAME. THEY TOO MUST BE REMEMBERED TOGETHER WITH THE NAMES OF ALL OUR FALLEN SERVICE PERSONNEL. WE ARE ALL FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS ON THIS EARTH; WE ARE ALL UNITED IN DEATH.

I would wear a red poppy if it did not function to hide the truth and obscure reality – if it wasn’t a way of enforcing a particular kind of collective memory which is actually designed to forget uncomfortable realities; if it wasn’t intimately tied up with a whole series of myths and untruths about heroic sacrifice and necessary violence in war. The truth is that war is cruel, bloody, and inglorious, and that the soldiers we remember are there to kill and maim fellow human beings, and to die screaming for their mothers. The truth is that when we send soldiers to kill others, we consign those who survive to mental and moral injury; a huge proportion of them will attempt suicide in one way or another after they return home. The truth is that many of our wars are nothing to do with freedom, liberty, or democracy; they are often illegal, pointless, or predatory. When the red poppy is associated with an honest debate on the reality and morality of our wars; when it acknowledges the truth about the horror of war and its often pointless slaughter of our best and brightest; then I would consider wearing a red poppy.

I would wear a red poppy if its fund-raising and symbolism had the true interests of the military personnel it purports to support at heart. The fact is that the best interests of every military person would be to never have to kill or face death or mutilation ever again, and certainly not for the squalid purposes most often dreamed up by our venal and vainglorious politicians. The funds raised by the red poppy should be used to work for the end of all war, not to make up for the short-coming in state support for military personnel or to prepare the nation for the further slaughter of our fellow citizens in future wars.

I would wear a red poppy if it wasn’t a way for the state to offset the costs of war so that it can engage in ever more military adventures. In truth, the state sends the nation’s young people to war and then refuses to spend the necessary money on supporting them when they return home. Buying a red poppy is in effect a second tax for funding war, as it allows the state to spend the money it should have spent on rehabilitation on buying new weapons and training new soldiers. Instead of buying a red poppy, we should demand that the state pay the full support and rehabilitation of all soldiers who need it out of the taxes we have already paid to the military. If this means that there is not enough money for the next military adventure because we are taking care of the last war’s victims, then this is how it should be. It should not be easy for governments to take the decision to go to war; they must pay the full cost. If the red poppy came to symbolize a challenge to government to properly care for service personnel; if it was a means to really question the decision to go to war, instead of implicitly supporting every war regardless of its morality; I would consider wearing a red poppy.

I would wear a red poppy if it wasn’t used socially to enforce an unthinking patriotism, and to punish and discipline those who would question the morality of war or the values of militarism. Those who fervently promote the red poppy often assert that the soldiers we remember fought for our freedom, but this does not include the freedom to question military values or public displays of violent patriotism. Anyone should be allowed to refuse to wear a red poppy in public on the basis of conscience without being questioned or looked down upon, or even to wear a different coloured poppy.

I would wear a red poppy if it wasn’t part of a broader militarism in our society which makes war more likely, rather than less; if it wasn’t bound up with national narratives of heroism and the legitimacy and rightness of military force; and if it wasn’t implicitly supportive of military values. If the red poppy came to symbolize opposition to war and support for peaceful values; I would consider wearing it.

I wear the White Poppy because it is an unambiguous commitment to peace, the end of all war and opposition to militarism. The Red Poppy may have once been part of a commemorative culture shortly after the First World War that was aimed at working towards ensuring that no one ever had to experience the horrors of war again; but this meaning has long since vanished, replaced instead by an insidious military patriotism. The White Poppy is now the main symbol of a commitment to remember all the victims of war, to tell the truth about war, to work to ensure that no soldier ever has to suffer its horrors again, and to make peace the central value of our culture, instead of militarism.

(You can order a white poppy to wear from: http://www.ppu.org.uk/whitepoppy/index.html)

The Chief – oils on board, 1988. The idea for this painting came from a photograph which my father has of a local chief who used to visit our mission-station. He was dressed as a European and carried a modern ‘wireless’, but he also carried a traditional spear. The painting points to the inherent conflict in modern African life between the traditional ways, and the secularisation which invariably comes with Western technology. It is a conflict  involving all areas of life. The consequences of losing a balance between the old ways and the new ways could be very serious. The Chief is given a kind of universal significance by the earth-like dome on which he stands. The confused background suggests the whirlwind nature of the conflict that he is in, although the rich colours could also suggest the passionate history of the African people. The single leg could imply the distorting and crippling effect that Western civilisation is having on the lives of ordinary Africans, as well as the way in which the new ways undermine traditional authority structures.

The Woman – oils on board, 1988. This painting was based on a quote from David Lamb’s book, The Africans, which states: ‘The African woman produces 70 percent of the food grown on the continent… women are responsible for gathering wood, raising children and harvesting crops.’ In other words, women in Africa carry a very oppressive work load. However, the analysis goes deeper than this. Most of the aid send to Africa is aimed at employing and helping men; power is put into the hands of men. It is likely that this is one of the reasons why aid has been so ineffectual in Africa. More could be achieved by empowering women instead. The style and significance of the symbols is similar to that of The Chief. Again, she is given universal significance, and the baby, hoe and wood indicates her role. The empty hand is waiting to be filled. The stormy background could be gathering conflict, as women gain a measure of consciousness and challenge traditional roles and contemporary aid schemes.

Picture of Poverty – oils on board, 1988. This painting is based on a photograph my father took of a starving woman in an area only 50km away from our mission-station. We delivered food supplies to the stricken region. The distorted nature of the woman’s face and arms shows the way that poverty and hunger can destroy the humanity of people. The inappropriate nature of much aid (coca-cola aid) is shown by the half-eaten five dollar bill and the coke can. The ambiguous nature of media attention is hinted at by the TV image and its life-line to the woman’s head. The background and style is pessimistic, heightened by the setting sun. The contribution of civil violence is hinted at by the US Army dress that she is wearing; in many parts of Africa, famines are exacerbated by continuing armed conflict. The picture challenges policy-makers to find better methods of helping people who are starving in absolute poverty.

The Coca Cola Wars – oils on board, 1988. This picture is an investigation into the positive and negative contributions of multi-national companies to Africa’s problems. It also looks at the effect that both repressive and revolutionary violence has on ordinary Africans. While multi-nationals often bring capital and employment, they also tend to rely on oppressive structures to keep them as high profit ventures. This can lead to a situation where the government has to use widespread terror tactics to quell opposition. This in turn, can lead to revolutionary groups employing the same tactics to fight the government. The style is based on several African artists who used to come knocking on our door trying to sell their paintings. It is a very honest style that indicates a specific world view. There is no divide between earth and sky but all the specifics are outlined. This indicates how everything has its place in the scheme of things. The colours are flat, there is no shading, which again indicates a world view where concepts are easily identified. Also, the size of the human figures relative to the huts, cow and cart also indicates a world view where humans are important, although not absolute.

The Beast They Call the Revolution – oils on board, 1988. This painting was inspired by the words of a Bruce Cockburn song: ‘See the loaded eyes of the children too/ trying to make the best of it the way kids do/ One day you’re going to rise from your habitual feast/ to find yourself staring down the throat of the beast/ they call the revolution’. Throughout my painting project, I began to see how bleak the future looks for poor nations. Although I am a strict pacifist, I began to realise that if I was faced by similar life conditions, revolutionary action would become a very real temptation. I do not condone revolution of a violent nature, but I do sympathise with it. The hungry naked boy, with a bloated belly caused by malnutrition, does not think of violent revolution. His eyes are innocent. But as he grows up and his life chances don’t change, the banner of revolution will beckon. He is a universal child representing millions in the same situation who have grown up in an age of revolution. This picture is both defiant and mournful, but the small flowers of peace wait by his feet. Maybe they are also the flowers of hope.

Well of course I wouldn’t do nothing – unless maybe he had a gun or a large axe and it would be suicidal to try and stop him! Even then, I wouldn’t do nothing; I’d try and stop him from killing my wife any way I could, or we’d hide and I’d call the police! But just because I would try and do something in this situation does not mean I support organized, industrial-scale killing, nor does it mean that I would not do anything in the case of an invasion of my country by a foreign army. Pacifism is an objection to organized political violence; it does not having much to do with ‘doing nothing’ when someone physically attacks you in your home! In fact, pacifism, when it combines with nonviolence, is actually about working actively for peace through a range of direct actions; doing nothing is not an option! In an invasion, for example, nonviolence means a range of non-cooperative and protest actions designed to make the invader withdraw because it becomes too costly for them, morally and materially.

Without getting into the immense problems we face when we take an individual ethical analogy and try to apply it to relations between nations and groups, or the problems with the Hollywood caricature of ‘Dr Evil’-type people who can only be stopped by violent death, my other problem with this question is that it is asked in an unfair and stupid way. Moreover, its implications are not actually acknowledged or thought through by the questioner. The valid and more accurate form of this question should really be: if an evil man came into your house and tried to kill your wife, would you get a group of your friends together, arm them with shotguns and grenades, and then go the evil man’s neighborhood, blow up his house, kill him and most of his family and friends, and burn down his neighborhood? After all, it is this organized and overwhelming military response which is implied in the initial question.

I actually think that this question works in favour of the pacifist position: If such a person attacked my house, I would of course respond by trying to restrain him, call the police and then testify against him in a court of law – as would most reasonable people. I wouldn’t get a gang together and try to kill him and all his children in a massive revenge attack a week or two later! That’s vigilantism and everyone knows it would be wrong. These days, society responds to acts of violence with law and restraint in the greater interests of creating and preserving a norm-based, peaceful society; it does not promote a violent jungle where force and violence is used by individuals to settle disputes and mete out ‘justice’ between them. The fact is the domestic sphere with its rules and its commitment to non-violent conflict settlement is exactly what we should be trying to create at the international level. This means trying harder to find alternatives to war (and vigilantism) – and ending the use of stupid analogies to justify immoral and counter-productive methods of solving conflicts or punishing law-breakers.

Another stupid question I get on this topic is: But what if there was genocide like the one in Rwanda or the Holocaust going on right now, wouldn’t you agree to send in the military to stop it? This is a stupid question because it is designed to force a pre-determined answer. I could equally ask: If there was a genocide going on right now and the only way to stop it was through nonviolence by trained peace activists, wouldn’t you agree to it? Or, if the Holocaust could have been prevented by universal disarmament and the ending of all national militaries, wouldn’t you agree to it? Of course, such questions are unfair and stupid because they have inbuilt assumptions which are not necessarily verifiable or falsifiable. It is not necessarily the case that sending in the military would stop the genocide, for example: it must just as easily accelerate the genocide, or inflame the war, draw in other nations, and cause more people to die than if no military intervention had occurred. It is only an assumption that military force is the best option for ending genocide, rather than nonviolent methods.

I also object to this question because it is devoid of history and context. I mean, what happened to get to this point where a regime is committing genocide, and could we have done something to stop it long ago? Why did everyone just sit around and watch while this particular regime or group organized a genocide and did nothing to stop it? Why were the peace activists who warned that our violent societies and violent politics would probably lead to this situation ignored? Is it really fair to blame them once genocide breaks out, when they have been the main ones working to try and stop such things from happening? In other words, the point is not to sit around waiting until violence gets really bad and then try and think of a solution. The point is to think about what causes violence and try and prevent it from happening in the first place. I think we could do this, but it would require new thinking about violence and war, and not constantly trying to justify holding onto violent methods with stupid, unfair questions directed against pacifists.

This leads to my other objection to this question: it is simply not an honest question and it just reproduces common ways of thinking and acting. Actually, in my view, it’s just an attempt to harangue pacifists. The people who ask this question are not seriously interested in hearing what pacifists have to say about alternatives to violence, how to build cultures of peace or how to resolve certain situations peacefully. The fact is, the people who ask me these questions have ignored every suggestion and warning I and other peace activists ever made for decades. They don’t really care what we think anyway; they prefer to keep the world the way it is. Peace activists said there were signs of a coming genocide in Rwanda and action needed to be taken; they said that there were more effective responses to terrorism than a war on terror; they said that invading Iraq would be a disaster; they said that selling arms to every dictator in the world was not conducive to peace; and so on, and so on. But every time, they were dismissed as naïve and unrealistic, and their practical suggestions were ignored.

Thus, my ultimate question in response to these stupid questions is: How many wars, genocides, bombings, tortures and killings – how many absolute disasters like the one in Afghanistan – will it take until you have sufficient evidence to prove that political violence has failed as a response to conflict, and you give peaceful and nonviolent policies serious consideration? You’ve given war and intervention a chance for hundreds of years without much success. When will you give nonviolence a chance?

[Thanks to Helen Dexter; her clarity and commitment on this subject has greatly influenced me over the past few years.]

If Wales was the West Bank, over 50% of Welsh land would have been appropriated for the exclusive benefit of English people, including English settlements, special security zones, a security wall separating Wales from England which took in 10% of Welsh land, English agricultural settlements, closed military zones, English-only roads and highways, and nature preserves. Welsh people would be prohibited from using or crossing English-only roads and territory, while English people would be face no such restrictions in travel. In all, there would be 699 restrictions on Welsh movements, and 38 statutes which the English authorities could use to appropriate Welsh land.

If Wales was the West Bank, there would be two separate bodies of law in operation: one set of military laws which applied to all native Welsh people, and English domestic law which covered all English settlers living in Wales.

If Wales was the West Bank, the municipal boundaries of Welsh towns and cities would be frozen, Welsh people would be denied the right to build new houses outside of municipal boundaries, and thousands of houses built without a permit would be routinely demolished by UK authorities. Welsh communities would soon face major problems of overcrowding and pressure on services.

If Wales was the West Bank, English settlers would be encouraged to come and settle on Welsh territory. Even if they had lived overseas for generations in places like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, they would get automatic English citizenship upon settling in Wales. They would also receive grants to cover the costs of moving there, permanent exemption from real estate and employment taxes, free education, and special grants for rent and utilities. Welsh inhabitants would not receive any such benefits.

If Wales was the West Bank, any Welsh person who moved to another country would immediately lose their right to return to live in Wales. English settlers would be allowed to reside or hold citizenship in another country without losing their right to reside in Wales.

If Wales was the West Bank, Welsh people would not have the right to citizenship in the UK, nor to citizenship in Wales, as Wales would not be recognized as a country. In contrast, English people anywhere in the world would have the automatic right to UK citizenship and access to assistance to return and settle there. There would be more than half a million English settlers in 120 settlements and outposts across Wales, taking up half of all Welsh land.

If Wales was the West Bank, Welsh people would have to suffer a burdensome permit system which required them to get a permit for almost everything, from repairing their home, making a deposit in their bank account, planting fruit trees, and which fields they might use their tractor in. English settlers would not face the same permit system.

If Wales was the West Bank, Welsh people would have to obtain permits to grow crops; permits would be granted on the basis of whether they competed with English agricultural production or not. In particular, Welsh farmers would need to get a special permit to grow onions (as a means of restricting their use as a palliative for the effects of teargas). No Welsh person would be allowed to establish a business which employed more than 10 people.

If Wales was the West Bank, all Welsh newspapers would have to get a permit and all publications would have to be approved by an English military censor.

If Wales was the West Bank, 87% of water supplies would be diverted to England and English settlers, while 13% would be distributed back to the Welsh population. Welsh people would pay from 4 to 20 times more for their water than English settlers, and would be restricted to 10 to 60 litres of water per day (less than the 100 litres per day minimum standard set by the World Health Organisation). English settlers would enjoy 274 to 450 litres per day, and every single English settlement would be connected to a running water network, while more than 200 Welsh communities would have no running water.

If Wales was the West Bank, Welsh people would be subject to military law, and would be tried by military tribunals in which there was no presumption of innocence, defendants would not be informed of charges until the first hearing, court decisions would often be based on secret evidence, the average hearing would last 3 minutes and 4 seconds, the military could hold defendants for six months without charge or trial (the six months could be renewed indefinitely), and acquittals would be obtained in only 0.29% of cases. Welsh children would be prosecuted as adults at age 12, while English settler children would not be prosecuted as adults until age 18.

If Wales was the West Bank, over 40% of the Welsh male population would have been imprisoned at some point, and 45 members of the Welsh Assembly would be in prison for belonging to a political party deemed a threat to the UK. Most Welsh political parties would be declared ‘terrorist organisations’, and any charitable, educational or cultural organisations deemed to be connected directly or indirectly to a political party would be subject to closure, destruction, and military attacks.

If Wales was the West Bank, Welsh public gatherings of more than 10 people would be forbidden unless the military authorities were given advance notice and the names of all attendees. English military forces would use live ammunition, tear gas, sounds bombs, rubber bullets and physical violence against public gatherings and demonstrations.

If you think this sounds far-fetched, check out the report, ‘Is Israel an Apartheid State?’ What is described above is only a small fraction of the restrictions and burdens currently on Palestinians.

My question is: can Israel really claim to be a democracy when it operates such a system? This situation is not only a crime against Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which states ‘the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’; it is also a real injustice against ordinary Palestinians and a major source of insecurity and violence, as apartheid in South Africa before it was. When will our politicians take it seriously and make a meaningful effort to resolve it? Why does America continue to openly support such a gross and open injustice? Why does the EU allow Israel a unique and special exemption from human rights obligations in order to trade?

It is time to stand up for Palestine, for justice and for peace.